Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks are the most common and easiest attacks to propagate over internet. It causes a high degree of destruction to the network and systems resources. The destructive nature of DDoS attacks force security engineers to design defense solutions which can detect and take counter actions to defend against such attacks. In this paper, we investigated the packet flood attacks and presented a collaborative peer to peer defense mechanism. The proposed solution detects the attack at victim edge router and sends the alert messages to its neighboring nodes which allow them to proactively defend themselves. Simulation results shows the efficiency of the solution with less false positives at victim edge router and less damage to the network due to proactive defense approach .
Introduction
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack is relatively simple but powerful technique to consume network and system resources. Most of these attacks are propagated in the network to halt the flow of network traffic or crash the system recourses. During the attack time, the victims experience a less efficient sharing of resources or completely disrupted. Large volume of legitimate & illegitimate packets and IP spoofing attacks are most destructive attacks that hinder defense solutions to protect network against such attacks. Attackers usually relay on trojan horse programs or zombie machines present in different networks to propagate packet flood attacks towards particular victim machine or network. In this situation defense solutions becomes ineffective as they could not accurately detect attacks and differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate packets. Our research studies [1] showed that in internet environment, we can deploy defense solutions on three locations; first near source node, second at backbone node and third at victim node (these node could be network or machines). Here each location has its own advantages and disadvantages of solution deployment. Attack detection near the source node can reduce the collateral damage but very distributed nature of attack make it harder for defense solution to detect attack traffic and may result in high false positive. Deploying defense solution at backbone has a tradeoff between efficiency and treat to the core network. Third location is victim machine or network, which is the ultimate goal of DDoS attacks for destruction. At this location, we have enough information that can be useful to differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate packets with less false/positive. Following we outlined some requirements for effective DDoS defense solution.
• Distributed Defense Solution: If we deploy defense solution at each available defense location and force all the nodes to work collectively than it will be difficult to launch a successful attack.
• Intelligent Traffic Management: Routers must deploy intelligent traffic management scheme, so that if there is congestions at any router than it propagate traffic load alerts to other routers. In this way, legitimate traffic can easily be retrieved at destination end.
• Detailed Attack Information: In the absence of any information about actual attacking mechanisms, it is very difficult for security solution engineers to make a cure. Attack information must include the attack type, IP packet Size, TTL Value, IP packet header length, server port number, attempted response, effectiveness and damages occurred by the attack
• Large Scale Evaluation: DDoS defense requires, large scale real time testing environment across the internet that can support thousands of nodes. Usually internet security vulnerability solution provides claim about the performance of their defense solutions on the bases of small scale performance evaluation
The solution can show best results only if it works in collaborative manner and most of networks on the internet adopt this feature. Increase in number of secure routers will show better defense against DDoS attacks.
Above stated requirements and our observation leads us to the conclusion that, instead of designing centralize defense systems, it is important to design distributed detection and defense system, where heterogeneous nodes can collaborate over the network and monitor traffic in cooperative manner. In this paper, we have investigated the packet flood attacks and proposed a collaborative peer to peer defense mechanism, where heterogeneous defence nodes are placed in the network to monitor traffic in cooperative manner with other nodes. The proposed solution detects the attack at victim edge router and sends the alert messages to its neighboring nodes which allow them to proactively defend themselves before it can affect the whole network. The cooperation between each detecting node is done with reliable communication mechanism. We aim that, deployment of our framework over internet will provide reliable and collaborative detection & defense, and can improve the efficiency of detection with the addition of detecting nodes in the network. The rest of the paper is organized as followed: In section 2 we review state of art, section 3 present our proposed mechanism, section 4 present the results and finally we conclude the paper in section 5.
Related Work
This section, presents the review of some presentative works that address different defence and detection solutions. Source edge router has high computational power and this is the location from where the attacker launches the attack [2] . Murkovic in [3] presented a D-Ward defense solution for DDoS at source end. D-Ward defense solution resides at border router that detects attack and drops the attack traffic near source to avoid the collateral damage [3] . D-Ward defense monitors all incoming and outgoing traffic and make light weighted traffic pattern. Any sudden change in traffic pattern will be the possible indication of attack and the traffic is discarded from entering into network. In another approach Gil and Poletto presented an approach to model normal traffic flow on the bases of aggregate traffic ratio and stop the attack traffic to flow into the network [2] . Author in [4] presented a distributed packet filtering (DPF) mechanism that validates the source address of inbound packets. DPF implementation on core routers identify the spoofed IP packet and drop illegitimate traffic. Pushback aggregated congestion control is an other approach where routers assume congestion as a symptom of DDoS attack and activate rate limiting according to local policy. If the congested router fails to control the overflow problem than it issues a rate limit request to its neighbor's intermediate routers. Later these requests are propagated to all routers along the traffic path those are enabled with push back capability [5] . COSSACK is an other solution that forms a multicast defense nodes group, which are deployed at source and victim network. Every connected defense node detects attack and issue alert to group for further attack prevention measurements [6] . Router based solutions trigger attack alert when they found sudden increase in the data traffic. Secure overlay service is also used to combat with the DDoS attack but it is not suitable for a publicly available service e.g. web servers and it routes traffic on sub optimal route on the overlay. Secondly, secure overlay service does not limit the damage from legitimate nodes that are subverted by the attacker [3] . Collaborative defense mechanism is effective solution only when the routers act as gateway, it locally locally identify the attack by the monitoring the drastic change in traffic flow [4] . Abdul et al in [7] demonstrated size based scheduling (SBS) an inbuilt weakness to DDOS attacks. Even though this research spotlight on Least Attained Service (LAS) in association to first in first out (FIFO) scheduling in routers, authors emphasize that all SBS method that support short flows should not diverge much from the performance of LAS under the kinds of attacks discussed. Wu et. al in [8] proposed an adaptive cyber security examining system that incorporates a number of module hybrid techniques such as decision fusion-based IDS, correlation computation of activity indicators, arbitrary matrix theory-based network representation of security activities, and event classification through network resemblance dimensions. All the aforementioned solutions have some limitation in one way or other. It is for the reason that they considered some factors and discounted other in their defense and detection solution.A scrutiny of all the presented work has encouraged us to develop a comprehensive and effective detection and defence solution that perform well and defend the network resources.
Proposed Scheme
Each network connected to internet is working according to local policies defined by its operator. Attacks can be generated/ propagated either by central source propagation and or by back chaining propagation [6] . Due to the distributed nature of internet, we proposed a peer-to-peer distributed alliance of defense node architecture. We focus on the following factors while proposing the defense mechanism.
• Sudden increase in traffic at some node can be possible attack indicator [9] .
• Although DDoS attack is originated from source but sometimes it causes the disruption in the whole communication channel. Considering distributed nature of attack it is proposed that the defense must be deployed in such a way that between source and victim each defense node can collaborates with each other to effectively prevent the attack at any location of network.
• To work efficiently in peer to peer fashion each node along the traffic path should be aware of present network condition so it can deploy better threat avoidance techniques. The information collaboration channel must be secure and can have tendency to mitigate the wrong alerts [10] .
• After detecting attack we filter traffic by deploying XOR packet marking [11] scheme. Packet encoding in IP header identification field will help us to distinguish between privileged and un-privileged traffic
• The defense mechanism should have ability to support the incremental nodes without disturbing the general network flow.
Architecture Overview
Like every other defense solution, we have also analyzed the traffic behaviors and used attack signatures to identify the DDoS attack. Traffic model is distinct by the sequence of number of packets at time slots at each monitoring point, which is modeled by the specific time slot d, window size D and metric of each slot. All incoming and outgoing traffic patterns are modeled as following data vectors. Traffic pattern A= (a1, a2,, an). Correlation coefficient will identify the traffic pattern correlation, we marked 'I' as incoming pattern and 'O' as outgoing represented in equation1.
The difference of traffic window size is represented as amplifier rate represented in equation 2.
Large a IO value shows the amplification in traffic. When peering node detects the DDoS attack it will extract a rate limit with following attack flow identifiers (IP Protocol Type, Server Port Number, TTL Value, IP Packet Header Length, IP/TCP/UDP checksums). After attack detection the system will generate alerts to all peering nodes along the traffic path. Based on attack alert, routers will deploy rate limiting. Attack alert has very critical role in our proposed scheme. A smart attacker can generate false attack alert to confuse the system and this alert will force routers to activate rate limiting and packet filtering. Alert should be propagated in secure environment because if the router is compromised than a part legitimate traffic may be dropped. Proposed scheme imply rate limiting for the traffic which contains attack signature. rate o (P a )=rate i (P a ) * ∂(con f idence a ) Here ∂(con f idence a ) ≤ 1 is referred to be the confidence level of identified attack signature. When ∂(con f idence a ) = 0 than ∂(con f idence a ) = 1. For better understanding of proposed scheme, suppose Node A and B is suspected as an attack generator for node Y. Both attacking nodes used node Z to forward traffic to Y. Obviously it is better to send the attack signature to Z on priority bases rather than other peering nodes. On receiving alert message the neighbor will discard the duplicate alert signature and forward it to its neighbor peering node. Based on the attack signatures information, each node adjust rate limit accordingly.
Multiple-Alert Public-Alert Cryptography
This concept was generalized by Colin Boyd [12] . Imagine a variant of public alert cryptography with three alerts: AM a 2 , AM b and AM c , distributed as shown in Table. 1. Router 1 can encrypt a message with AM a so that Router 5 , with AM b and AM c , can decrypt it. Router 2 can encrypt a message so that Router 6 can read it, and Router 3 can encrypt a message so that Router 4 can read it. Router 4 can encrypt a message with AMa so that Router 5 can read it, with AM b so that Router 6 can read it, or with both AM a and AM b so that Router 3 can read it. Similarly, Router 5 can encrypt a message so that Router 1 , Router 4 or Router 6 can read it. All the possible combinations are summarized in Table. 2.; there are no other ones. Proposed cryptographic architecture can be extended on 'n' alerts. If a given subset of the alert is used to encrypt the message, then the other alerts are required to decrypt the message.
Single Router Message Scheduling
To avoid alert congestion at routers, we proposed the router message transfer scheduling 1 |Prec| f max with f max = max n j=1 f j (C j ) and f j monotone for j=1 ...n, it is sufficient to construct an optimal sequence π : π(1),π(2),....,π(n) (π(i) denotes the action in position i). Let N= 1,...n be the set of all events i.e. alert propagation and denoted by S ⊆ N the set of unscheduled events alert generation p(s) = jÎS p j To give the precise description message scheduling process, we represent the precedent constraints by the corresponding adjacency matrix A=(a i j ) where a i j =1 if and only if j is the direct successor of i. 
Marking
After attack detection, we encode XOR marking in 16-bit IP header identification field to differentiate between legitimate and non legitimate traffic. For encoding of IP address of routers we used two hash functions h 1 ' and 'h 2 '. If router R a decides to mark in the identification field of the IP packet, it marks h 1 (R a ) in the edge. If the packet is previously marked than it will XOR the h 2 (R a ) with the edge field value and writes with the result of XOR in fragmented IP header identification field. A B = (A∧!B) ∨ (!A ∧ B) = (A ∨ B) ∧ (!A∨!B). In figure 1 router will use last n-bit of IP address and apply XOR function among the current marking bit and the previous marking bit. After XOR operation IP finger print will be embedded into identification field. The reason to using two independent hash functions is to distinguish two routers. In the presence of hop count knowledge, it is impossible for an attacker to fake an IP finger print with hop count less than its own [13] . The percentage of faked marks reaching the victim is very less when the attack is coming from far away network, given the nature of the packet marking. The marking scheme should be dynamically changeable to avoid sophisticated DDoS attack i.e. there is slight probability that an Algorithm 2 Marking Algorithm.
1: Packet Mark = n (IP Address) 2: for each packet 3: read H = hop count field value 4: generate a marking bit decision number 5: y (1,0)∼ 0≤ y¡ 1 6: If y=0 7: P.edge ← h 1 (R a ) ∴ P = Packet 8:
P.edge ← P.edge h 2 (Ra)
attacker may capture normal traffic and can guess the packet marking style. After changing the encoding style, send the previous marking data along with the new marking data. At destination, router table will compare the marking field if it is matched with its marking field dictionary then routing table will add the new marking field in its dictionary to authenticate the next stream of packets. The position of mark is determined on the bases of TTL modulo. We mark the IP packet at the right n bit and shift the packet marking to left.
Effects of Path Stability
If the route of internet traffic is changed than source's privileged traffic might effect and might be dropped by the routers in the path. In this situation the source will re-authenticate itself through the new handshake. Using proposed scheme, the routers will forward only authenticated traffic and unprivileged traffic will be dropped during the attack phase.
Performance Results
To verify the effectiveness of our proposed scheme we have simulated our solution in NS-2 3 . Table. 3. illustrate the simulation environment and parameter used in simulation, each test is repeated five times. The important effectiveness measure is the time needed for attack detection. This time is measured from the start of attack. We detect attack at early stages, but the defense start dropping the attack traffic when it accessed the predefined threshold value for attack tolerance. In learning phase each end host on the attack path sends packets to the victim. We observe our results at different threshold to get the optimize threshold value for our scheme. Figure2(a) & (b) shows the proposed solution performance based on different attack tolerance threshold. As soon the attack is detected the alerts are propagated throughout the attack path, which decrease the false positive rate. To evaluate the effectiveness of defense mechanism to detect attack traffic, we measured total amount of attack traffic sent to the victim. This helps us to calculate that how much traffic bypass through our filter and reached at victim. Ideally this value should be zero. Figure 3(a) , illustrates the performance of solution on high data flood attack. Figure 3(b) , shows the attack detection efficiency of solution with respect to change in traffic rate, the results shows efficiency of 93% with only 7% false positive rate. Simulation data showed that as far as the traffic contains our embedded marking and it does not match with attacker marking, we will have approximately two percent false positive. It is noted that a single attack packet with a particular marking received during the learning phase of the DDoS attack causes all packets with that marking to be dropped during the attack phase. Finally traffic tradeoffs between detection rate and false positive rate is shown in figure 4 . 
Conclusion
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks causes a high degree of destruction in the network and systems. Most of these attacks are propagated in the network to halt the flow of network traffic or crash the system recourses. Attacker usually relay on trojan horse programs or zombie machines to float attacks in the network. In this paper, we have analyzed DDoS problem in two directions, firstly we studied the cause of attack and its implications, secondly design and implementation issues of defense architectures under various scenarios. Our observation leads us to the conclusion that, instead of designing centralize defense systems, it is important to design distributed detection and defense system where heterogeneous nodes can collaborate over the network and monitor traffic in cooperative manner. This paper presents a distributed collaborative detection and defense mechanism, where heterogeneous defence nodes can be placed in the network to monitor traffic in cooperative manner with other nodes in network. The cooperation between each detecting node is done with reliable communication mechanism. Directional information exchange mechanism is used to improve accuracy of each individual node. We aim that, deployment of our framework over internet will provide reliable and collaborative detection & defense, and can improve the efficiency of detection with the addition of detecting nodes in the network.
